KNOWLEDGE + DEMOCRACY

SCIENCE



TRIP

April 1-3

2011

Three Rivers Philosophy Conference

PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

TRIP 2011 Three Rivers Philosophy Conference

SCIENCE • KNOWLEDGE + DEMOCRACY

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University of South Carolina (USC) Department of Philosophy
The American Philosophical Association
USC Center for Bioethics and Medical Humanities
USC Consortium for Science, Technology, Environment, and Medicine in Society
USC Department of Political Science • USC Libraries

SCHEDULE

All sessions take place in the Ernest F. Hollings Wing of the Thomas Cooper Library.

Friday, April 1

9:00-9:10 PROGRAM ROOM

Welcoming Remarks

Steven Lynn, Senior Associate Dean for Liberal Arts, College of Arts and Sciences
Kevin Elliott and Justin Weinberg, Conference Organizers, USC Philosophy

9:10-10:20 PROGRAM ROOM

"Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony"
Elizabeth Anderson

10:20-10:35
Break

10:35-12:35
Paper Session 1

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Jennifer Baker	ROOM 130 Chair: Anne Bezuidenhout
10:35	•Boaz Miller "A Theory of Knowledge-Based Scientific Consensus"	•Catherine Womack & Norah Mulvaney-Day "Situated Knowers"
11:15	•Heather Douglas "Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society"	•David Taylor - "Citizens, Scientists, and Citizen-Scientists: On Relieving the Tensions Between Science and Democracy"
11:55	•Kyle White & Daniel Steel "Public Participation and Meta-Criteria"	•Frans A.J. Birrer "Knowledge Inequalities and Elites: Key Issues for Democracy"

Friday, April 1

(continued)

12:35-1:40
Lunch

Food available for purchase at restaurants on the 1st & 2nd floors of the RUSSELL HOUSE.
The dining room at the rear of the 2nd floor is reserved for conference attendees.

1:40-3:00
Paper Session 2

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Tom Burke	ROOM 130 Chair: David Meeler
1:40	•David Budtz Pedersen "The Political Epistemology of Modern Science Policy"	•Jonathan Trerise "Patents and the Openness of Science"
2:20	•Mark Brown "John Dewey, Science Policy, and the Limits of Epistemic Democracy"	•Justin Biddle "Intellectual Property and the Public Benefits of Biomedical Research"

3:00-3:15
Break

3:15-4:35
Paper Session 3

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Richard Holmes	ROOM 130 Chair: Michael Dickson
3:15	•Benjamin Hale "Geoengineering Research, the Demands of Knowledge, and the Right Reasons"	•Carole J. Lee "Mechanically Objective Measures of Peer Review vs. Procedural Objectivity"
3:55	•Mariam Thalos "A Distributed Model of Normative Choice for Public Policy"	•Kirstin Borgerson "Useless, Repetitive, and Secretive? The Scientific Validity of Clinical Trials"

4:35-4:50
Break

4:50-6:00 PROGRAM ROOM

"Is the Virtue of Testimonial Justice a Virtue for Scientists?"

Miranda Fricker

6:00
Break for Dinner

7:30-10:00

COLUMBIA MUSEUM OF ART
1515 MAIN STREET (MAIN & HAMPTON)

Arts & Draughts

A party at the museum featuring live music, short films, a dance show, tours of the galleries, including the current photography exhibit, "Who Shot Rock & Roll?" and more. Meet in the upstairs lounge.

Saturday, April 2

9:00-10:10 PROGRAM ROOM
"Relying on Experts As We Reason Together"
Henry S. Richardson

10:10-10:25
Break

10:25-12:25
Paper Session 4

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Laura Cupples	ROOM 130 Chair: Christopher Tollefsen
10:25	•Jeff Kochan "Does Scientific Objectivity Have a Life of Its Own? In the Arctic, for example?"	•Govind Persad - "Public Reason Beyond Religion: Elaborateness, Dispute, and the Exclusion of Scientific Theories"
11:05	•Kevin Elliott "Selective Ignorance: Causes, Implications, and Responses"	•Cara O'Connor - "Rethinking Civility: Rawls, Habermas, and the Civic Role of Nonpublic Reasons"
11:45	•Jeroen Van Bouwel - "What Can Democratic Theory Teach Us about Scientific Pluralism, Objectivity, and Consensus?"	•Karin Jonch-Clausen & Klemens Kappel "Social Epistemic Liberalism and Non-Scientific Belief"

12:25-1:30
Lunch
Catered lunch by Bone-In Artisan BBQ on the RUSSELL HOUSE patio. (If raining: RUSSELL HOUSE room 302)

1:30-3:30
Paper Session 5

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Gordon Purves	ROOM 130 Chair: Michael Stoeltzner
1:30	•Laszlo Kosolosky "Scientific Consensus: What Does it Entail?"	•Anke Büter "The Fate of Value Freedom"
2:10	•David Rice "The Epistemic Significance of Scientific Disagreement"	•Daniel Hicks "On the Ideal of Autonomous Science"
2:50	•Brent Ranalli "Reflection on the Role of Consensus in Science"	•Klemens Kappel "Liberal Democracy and Epistemic Neutrality"

Saturday, April 2

(continued)

3:30-4:20

Poster Session BRITTAIN GALLERY

Susan Dieleman - "Free Speech, Humiliation and Participation"

Nathan Eckstrand - "Reassessing Genetic, Social, and Political Diversity"

James McCollum - "Public Intellectual Virtue: Epistemic Injustice and the Social Sciences"

Silke Schicktanz & Mark Schweda - "The Epistemological and Normative Value of 'Being Affected': Representation and Participation of Patients and Lay Persons in Public and Policy Debates on Bioethics."

Madeleine Suttie - "The Inclusion of 'Lay Experts' on Parliamentary Advisory Committees: Implications for Representation and Expertise"

4:20-6:20

Paper Session 6

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Michele Merritt	ROOM 130 Chair: Matthew Kisner
4:20	•Rebecca Kukla "Medicalization, Justice, and the Definition of Health"	•Thomas Cunningham "What is Group Decision-Making? A Normative Model of Medical Choice "
5:00	•Robyn Bluhm "Can Well-Ordered Science Save Evidence-Based Health Policy?"	•Nicholas Zavediuk "Deliberative Democracy and Experimental Social Psychology"
5:40	•Yashar Saghai "The Democratic Legitimacy of Public Health"	•Amy Trautwein "Fair Juries, Feeling Jurors: Rationality and Emotion in the Pursuit of Justice"

Sunday, April 3

9:00-10:10 PROGRAM ROOM

"The Evolution of Consensus Conferences"

Miriam Solomon

10:10-10:30

Break

10:30-12:30

Paper Session 7

	PROGRAM ROOM Chair: Konstantin Pollok	ROOM 130 Chair: Travis Rieder
10:30	•Heather Phillips - "Moral and Epistemic Responsibilities of Experts and Laypersons"	•Kareem Khalita "Accountability and the Theoretical Virtues"
11:10	•Matthew Brown - "Democratic Control of the Scientific Control of Politics"	•Amanda Roth - "A Procedural, Pragmatist Account of Ethical Objectivity"
11:50	•Pavel Hardos - "Experts, Politics of Expertise and Democracy"	•Eric Winsberg - "Objectivity and Uncertainty in Climate Models"

AUTHORS & ABSTRACTS

Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan
"Democracy, Public Policy, & Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony" (Friday Morning Plenary)
Responsible public policy making in a technological society must rely on complex scientific reasoning. Given that ordinary citizens cannot directly assess such reasoning, does this call the democratic legitimacy of technical public policies in question? It does not, provided citizens can make reliable second-order assessments of the consensus of trustworthy scientific experts. I develop criteria for lay assessment of scientific testimony and demonstrate, in the case of claims about anthropogenic global warming, that applying such criteria is easy for anyone of ordinary education with access to the Web. However, surveys show a gap between the scientific consensus and public opinion on global warming in the U.S. I explore some causes of this gap, and argue that democratic reforms of our culture of political discourse may be able to address it.

Justin Biddle, Georgia Institute of Technology
"Intellectual Property and the Public Benefits of Biomedical Research" (Session 2)
In a much-discussed essay in the journal *Science*, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg argue that the proliferation of patenting and licensing in biomedical research is leading to a "tragedy of the anticommons" that is both epistemically and socially detrimental because it inhibits the sharing of information. Their paper has generated much discussion, and there are many who argue that the worries expressed in it are highly exaggerated. This paper examines this debate and concludes that we still have strong reasons to worry about a tragedy of the anticommons.

Frans A.J. Birrer, Leiden University
"Knowledge Inequalities and Elites: Key Issues for Democracy" (Session 1)
Democracy assumes that citizens should somehow have opportunities to insert their wishes and interests into societal (governmental) decision making. This only makes sense of citizens are equipped with the knowledge (information and skills) necessary for adequate judgment. Since knowledge inequalities pervade almost any current policy topic one can think of, they form a key issue to consider in the design of democratic procedures. Though the meaning of and procedures for democracy are a hot topic today, attention for knowledge inequalities is highly disappointing. The talk will address this lacuna, exploring both procedural and (semi) epistemic implications, including the role of (knowledge) elites.

Robyn Bluhm, Old Dominion University
"Can 'well-ordered science' save evidence-based health policy (EBHP)?" (Session 6)
Advocates of EBHP suggest that research can provide an unbiased basis for policy. Others worry that EBHP obscures the value-laden nature of policy-making. Both groups, however, view research itself as value-free. I draw on Kitcher's account of "well-ordered science" to argue that recognizing the value-laden nature of research might benefit EBHP by making value commitments explicit. Kitcher's recommends the use of "significance graphs" presenting scientific information relevant to an issue being deliberated. I assess the possibility of amending significance graphs to include information about values, making the graphs a useful tool for EBHP.

Kirstin Borgerson, Dalhousie University
"Useless, Repetitive and Secret? Assessing the Scientific Validity of Clinical Trials" (Session 3)
Clinical research ought to be scientifically valid. In this paper I draw on recent research by clinical epidemiologists in order to identify and critique two particular assumptions underlying current conceptions of scientific validity: first, that the appropriate level of analysis when assessing scientific validity is the isolated individual clinical trial, and second that scientific validity should be assessed independently of the other ethical requirements of research. Each of these problematic assumptions stems from a general failure to appreciate the ways science is a social practice.

Mark Brown, CSU Sacramento
"John Dewey, Science Policy, and the Limits of Epistemic Democracy" (Session 2)
This paper explores two limits of recent work on epistemic democracy. First, epistemic democrats often exaggerate the analogies between science and democracy. For Dewey, democracy involved not only inquiry but also advocacy. Moreover, Dewey argued that science, like other non-state institutions, requires provisional insulation from politics. Second, Dewey rejected correspondence views of representation in both science and politics, suggesting that political representatives should not be expected to echo the deliberations of either laypeople or experts. Lay deliberation may contribute to the epistemic task of finding correct answers to science policy problems. But democracy requires more than correct answers.

Matthew Brown, University of Texas, Dallas
"Democratic Control of the Scientific Control of Politics" (Session 7)
I will argue for two popular but apparently contradictory theses: (1) the democratic control of science and (2) the scientific control of policy. Many arguments can be given for (1), both epistemic and moral/political. I will argue that we must accept (2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (1). I will set out a framework in which (1) and (2) can be consistently combined: democratic technocracy.

Anke Büter, Bielefeld University
"The Fate of Value-Freedom: On the Epistemic Significance of the Context of Discovery" (Session 5)
While it is mostly granted today that actual science is not always value-free, the idea that it ought to be is often held on to. Yet value-freedom also faces problems if understood as a normative ideal, since its contemporary version requires more than the minimal condition to not simply replace evidence by values. In particular, it rests on the assumption that the contexts of discovery and application are epistemologically irrelevant. I will argue that this is untenable and that a normative conception of science should therefore integrate the possibility of value-influences.

Thomas Cunningham, University of Pittsburgh
"What is Group Decision-Making? The Case of Shared Decision-Making as a Normative Model of Medical Choice" (Session 6)
This paper has two goals, motivated by thinking about the "Shared Decision-Making Model" of medical choice (SDM). First, I argue the topic of medical decision-making is an excellent case study in individual and group rationality, which serves well as a case for philosophical reflection. Second, I consider the empirical foundations of SDM and argue that while they sufficiently demonstrate that treatment decisions are social in nature, SDM fails to articulate a normative position for why such decisions should be social rather than simply are social. I conclude by sketching a line of reasoning for providing this missing normative account.

Susan Dieleman, York University
"Free Speech, Humiliation & Participation" (Poster Session)
In this paper, I offer an epistemological defence of placing limits on free speech. To frame my discussion, I contrast the classical liberal theory of J.S. Mill, in which speech should be suppressed only when it will cause direct harm, and the contemporary liberalism of Richard Rorty, in which speech should be limited to avoid humiliation. Drawing on the resources made available by Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice, I assert that humiliating speech can exclude individuals and their epistemic resources from important discursive spheres, and conclude that participation, which requires placing limits on humiliating speech, offers greater likelihood of epistemic success.

Heather Douglas, University of Tennessee, Knoxville / University of Pittsburgh
"Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society" (Session 1)
Weighing complex sets of evidence (i.e. from multiple disciplines and often divergent in implications) is increasingly central to properly informed decision-making. Determining "where the weight of evidence lies" is essential both for making maximal use of available evidence and figuring out what to make of such evidence. But the democratic context in need of weight of evidence analysis also places additional constraints on the process, from explicability and transparency to timeliness of process. Qualitative and quantitative approaches will be compared with respect to both traditional epistemic criteria and criteria that arise from the democratic context.

Nathan Eckstrand, Duquesne University
"Reassessing Genetic, Social, and Political Diversity: A Rawlsian and Deleuzean Perspective on Categorizing the Body Politic" (Poster Session)
This paper examines the implications of recent reassessments of the amount of genetic diversity within the human genome for democratic theory. In doing so it uses the work of John Rawls and Gilles Deleuze to show how to accommodate for the previously undiscovered amount of diversity within the populace, new methods for categorizing groups within the body politic must be developed which are not predetermined by older understandings of identity. These categories must be chosen through a veil of ignorance, as Rawls puts forth in *A Theory of Justice*, and through an understanding of the processes of individuation Deleuze discusses in *Difference and Repetition*.

Kevin Elliott, University of South Carolina
"Selective Ignorance: Causes, Implications, and Responses" (Session 4)
Scientific research obviously involves selective choices about what research topics to pursue, and this selectivity leaves us ignorant about some phenomena while keeping us relatively well informed about others. In this paper, I argue that the sources of our ignorance are often more subtle than they initially appear; they can involve selective choices about what metrics to employ, what language to use for describing phenomena, and what research strategies to pursue. Using case studies from recent research on both environmental pollution and agricultural production, I illustrate the social significance of our selective ignorance and offer some strategies for responding to it.

Miranda Fricker, Birkbeck, University of London
"Is the Virtue of Testimonial Justice a Virtue for Scientists?" (Friday Afternoon Plenary)
I will look at what seems to be an example of testimonial injustice in the history of science, namely the case of Semmelweis, the Hungarian physician who in 1847 discovered that hand washing with chlorinated lime solution by doctors radically reduced the incidence of puerperal fever in mothers. But his hypothesis was not accepted, and many more mothers died unnecessarily as a result. In so far as his hypothesis was not accepted owing to prejudice, the example suggests that testimonial justice is a virtue that the scientific community needs to have. This thought then prompts the question, in what form(s) might the scientific community possess the virtue – as individuals, and/or institutionally. I shall put forward different models for how communities of scientists might collectively possess the virtue.

Benjamin Hale, University of Colorado
"Geoengineering Research, the Demands of Knowledge, and the Right Reasons" (Session 3)
In other work I have suggested that actions taken in order to manipulate the climate of the biosphere ought not to be evaluated independently of the antecedent conditions that have given rise to their deployment. Only once the full act description is subjected to the justificatory standards of wide deliberative scrutiny—the scrutiny of all affected parties—can we gain insight into the permissibility of any given geoengineering proposal. The same reasoning works to proscribe geoengineering *research*. In this paper, I aim to specify the parameters for permissible and impermissible research into geoengineering.

Pavol Hardos, Central European University, Budapest
"Experts, Politics of Expertise, and Democracy" (Session 7)
The recognition of potential conflict between democratic rule and expert knowledge occupies a core position in democratic theory. The ideal of democracy, epitomized as an essential value of citizen participation and political equality, runs afoul allegations of unequal fitness of individuals to make informed judgments and pronouncements on matters of community as well as the expectations that the democratic process brings about some desirable or correct results. An increasing reliance on the epistemic superiority of expert judgment and depoliticization in decision-making threatens democratic legitimacy. I propose to examine how experts and their relation to democratic politics can be conceptualized and grounded within a broader framework of political equality.

Daniel Hicks, University of Notre Dame
"On The Ideal of Autonomous Science" (Session 5)
In this paper I first use Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of a practice to develop a version of the common, through increasingly controversial, ideal of value-free, value-neutral, or autonomous science. I then briefly show how this ideal has been used by some philosophers to criticize both governmental and commercial funding of science. I go on to argue that, far from being itself value-neutral, certain elements of this ideal strongly resemble some controversial elements of libertarian political philosophy. I suggest that alternative ideals for science might be developed by drawing on egalitarian liberal and communitarian political philosophy.

Karin Jonch-Clausen and **Klemens Kappel**, University of Copenhagen
"Social Epistemic Liberalism and Non-Scientific Belief" (Session 4)
Recently Robert Talisse has argued that a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy (SEJ) is available that accommodates most, if not all, reasonable citizens and moral worldviews. We argue that SEJ either (i) has a more limited scope since it excludes as irrational a significant group of religious citizens who base their moral worldviews on non-scientific beliefs or (ii) SEJ does include these citizens as rational, but many of them will reasonably reject SEJ's central claim that open reason-exchange secured by liberal institutions is conducive to proper moral inquiry.

Klemens Kappel, University of Copenhagen
"Liberal Democracy and Epistemic Neutrality" (Session 5)
Liberal democracies feature disagreements over vital matters of fact, such as the clashes over the existence and causes of climate change and the disputes intelligent design and Darwinian. This contribution advocates taking seriously a rather neglected question: Should liberal democracy somehow be neutral in such conflicts? After all, liberal democracy aims to be neutral in an important range of disagreements of value. Why not extend this neutrality to unresolved factual disagreements, when they are deemed vital by those involved? If not, then why not?

Kareem Khalita, Middlebury College
"Accountability and the Theoretical Virtues" (Session 7)
Using psychological literature on accountability effects, I argue that if epistemic fairness and accountability to diverse perspectives are necessary for doing good science, then certain theoretical virtues (simplicity, scope, fit with background belief, fit with empirical data, neatness, and testability) should be privileged as canons of theory choice. This position challenges the traditional view that the virtues are metaphysically grounded and are completely immune to contextual factors. However, it also challenges social-epistemological positions that take the virtues to be radically plastic and to be playing the same epistemic role as moral and cultural values.

Jeff Kochan, University of Konstanz
"Does Scientific Objectivity Have a Life of Its Own? In the Arctic, for Example" (Session 4)
I critically adapt Hacking's notion of "styles of reasoning" to conditions in the Canadian Arctic, where bureaucrats have been eager to integrate aboriginal knowledge into biological science. Hacking argues that styles explain objectivity because they include stabilizing techniques, which allow them to break free from history, achieving a life of their own. I argue, in contrast, that the stability of these techniques depends on the stability of the social order in which they are employed. Drawing from historical and ethnographic records, I show that the objective style of Northern science has been affected by shifting relations between wildlife biologists and aboriginal hunters.

Laszlo Kosolosky, Ghent University
"Scientific Consensus: What Does it Entail?" (Session 5)
I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that (medical) consensus conferences miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity? (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between academic and non-academic consensus, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of consensus when applied in scientific practice.

Rebecca Kukla, Georgetown University / University of South Florida
"Medicalization, Justice, and the Definition of Health" (Session 6)
'Health' is an intuitive notion, not a technical term, and it has proven surprisingly difficult to come up with a definition of health that comes close to accommodating all our core intuitions about what work the concept should do. I distinguish between 'scientistic' definitions of health—whose goal is to give an account of health and disease that meets the standards of the natural sciences—and 'thick normative' definitions of health—whose goal is to characterize health in a way that makes the notion useful within a normative account of social justice and health policy. I argue that these are incompatible demands on the concept; no scientistic conception of health will play a robust role in a normative social theory (and vice-versa). I propose a thick normative account of health that defines health in relationship to social institutions and practices, but which is also responsive to naturalistic facts about the body in a way that standard social constructionist accounts of health and disease are not.

Carole J. Lee, University of Washington
"Mechanically Objective Measures of Peer Review vs. Procedural Objectivity" (Session 3)
Empirical research has found inter-rater reliability rates for expert peer reviewers to be so low as to be "poor" by psychometric standards. Psychometrically oriented researchers construe such low measures as damning for the practice of peer review. I argue that this perspective overlooks different forms of normatively appropriate disagreement among reviewers. Of special interest are Kuhnian questions about the extent to which the variance in reviewer ratings can be accounted for by normatively appropriate disagreements about how to interpret and apply evaluative criteria within disciplines during times of normal science. Until these empirical-cum-philosophical analyses are done, it will remain unclear the extent to which low inter-rater reliability measures represent reasonable disagreement rather than arbitrary differences between reviewers.

James McCollum, St. Louis University
"Public Intellectual Virtue" (Poster Session)
Miranda Fricker's vision of hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical virtue can be fruitfully brought to bear on the intersection of the social sciences and political philosophy especially if we we see Amartya Sen's Informational Basis approach to injustice as analogous to the epistemological and moral shift that occurred when the concept of sexual harassment was introduced. Concepts of

(**James McCollum,** continued from previous page)
development, I will argue, were epistemically unjust prior to the new metrics pioneered by Amartya Sen in his capabilities approach. In the poster, I will examine the possibility of unjust conceptual paradigms in the social sciences.

Boaz Miller, University of Toronto
"A Theory of Knowledge-Based Scientific Consensus" (Session 1)
Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is unclear that such deference to consensus is always justified. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not indicate the existence of shared knowledge among the consensus community. An agreement in a community is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for reasons such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. I address the question of when it is likely that a consensus is in fact knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is likely to be knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation thereof, and I identify three conditions – social calibration, apparent consilience of evidence, and social diversity for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus.

Cara O'Connor, SUNY Stony Brook
"Rethinking Civility: Rawls, Habermas, and the Role of Nonpublic Reasons" (Session 4)
Rawls's idea of public reason has long been criticized for being too restrictive. It is argued that asking citizens to limit their arguments on important political issues to terms of common sense and uncontroversial social-scientific findings excludes the voices of those whose beliefs do not correlate with generally accepted views about the world. My presentation locates resources for moving beyond the theoretical impasse in Rawls's idea of "reasoning from conjecture," a form of argumentation requiring close engagement with doctrines that appear to conflict with basic liberal principles, in order to discover interpretations that can support a liberal conception of justice.

David Budtz Pedersen, University of Copenhagen
"The Political Epistemology of Science Policy Indicators" (Session 2)
When reviewing the relationship between science, knowledge and democracy, often attention is given only to input democracy, that is, models of democracy which focus more or less exclusively on how democratic decision-making is influenced by scientific knowledge, and how scientific expertise affect the democratic polity in its political deliberations. This paper examines an alternative approach as it turns the focus on output democracy, that is, the multiple ways in which modern democracies and administrations manage, organize, and evaluate the outcome of scientific institutions, concretely, the epistemology of indicators and related approaches for the evaluation of scientific knowledge.

Govind Persad, Stanford University
"Public Reason Beyond Religion: Elaborateness, Dispute, and the Exclusion of Scientific Theories" (Session 4)
Rawlsian public reason explicitly excludes not only arguments grounded in comprehensive doctrines, but also those grounded in scientific theories that are both "elaborate" and "in dispute." I first explicate "elaborateness" and "dispute": an elaborate theory requires more than commonsense knowledge to be understood, while a disputed one is controversial among relevant inquirers. I then defend the exclusion of elaborate, disputed science as parallel to the exclusion of comprehensive doctrines: both exclusions serve the same appealing ideal of legitimacy. I close by considering practical challenges—like climate policy—and suggest how science can avoid combining elaborateness and dispute while remaining relevant.

Heather Phillips, Rice University
"Beyond Democracy: Moral & Epistemic Responsibilities of the Expert & Layperson" (Session 7)
Debates concerning democracy and expertise can divert focus from moral and epistemic wrong-doing that emerges within the expert/layperson relationship. I contend that much of this wrong-doing will be left unresolved by attempts to square expertise and democracy. However, attention to these concerns can illuminate, resolve or even dissolve problems central to the democracy/ expertise debate. Here I focus on the epistemic asymmetry inherent to the expert/layperson relationship and how it is abused. I offer a picture of the responsible expert and layperson and indicate how this model addresses both abuse of epistemic asymmetry and worries about expertise and democratic governance.

Brent Ranalli, The Cadmus Group
"Reflection on the Role of Consensus in Science" (Session 5)
Scientists are expected to be radically individualistic in exercising judgment, but it is the scientific community's ability to achieve consensus that enables it to certify new knowledge for the lay public. We explore this productive tension in two ways. First, we look to foundational thinkers in the 17th century for insight into the origins of this model of certifying knowledge with hard-won consensus. Second, we turn to the contemporary climate change debate as a case study that reinforces the model in some ways and challenges it in others.

David L. Rice, University of Arkansas
"The Epistemic Significance of Scientific Disagreement: The Hierarchical Model and the Equal Weight View" (Session 5)
If two scientific peers are equally reliable yet come to different conclusions about the evidence, theories or aims of science, then according to the Equal Weight view both of them should suspend belief on the proposition in question. I will argue that it is not always in the interests of scientists to adopt the Equal Weight view and that scientists can have reasonable disagreements even in cases of shared evidence and methods. Even if two or more scientists find themselves in a disagreement and have disclosed all of their relevant evidence, the dispute might not be the result of the evidence alone but of methodology or axiology. Thus, not all cases of scientific disagreements serve as genuine higher-order evidence that one or more parties in a purported dispute have been irrational. Instead disputes might emerge out of the complexities of consensus formation, methods or how science is actually practiced on the ground. Given that science rationally allows for differences in methodology, similiar evidence shared by two scientists does not necessarily indicate that those scientists are likewise using similar methods or axiology.

Henry Richardson, Georgetown University
"Relying on Experts As We Reason Together" (Saturday Morning Plenary)
Is relying on experts conceptually compatible with reasoning together? Reasoning is a process of explicit thinking, one the reasoner retains the freedom to take in different directions. Reliance on experts threatens the possibility of collective reasoning by partially blocking common awareness of the relevant thoughts. Reliance on experts threatens the freedom of collective reasoning by interfering with its unity and by introducing potentially unchallengeable subunits. These threats can be averted by further institutional measures: by guaranteeing the possibility of public scrutiny of expert reasoning, by ordering the reasoning so that the threat to its unity is limited, and by providing adequate mechanisms for appeal, challenge, and reconsideration.

Amanda Roth, University of Michigan
"A Procedural, Pragmatist Account of Ethical Objectivity" (Session 7)
Taking inspiration from Dewey's pragmatism and feminist epistemology, I put forth a procedural, pragmatist account of ethical objectivity. I motivate this account by asking what the point of ethical objectivity is and then go on to lay out the four pillars of my view: 1) objectivity is process-

(**Amanda Roth,** continued from previous page)
based, 2) our inquiry is constrained by the world, 3) objective ethical inquiry can be undertaken by an individual or a community, and 4) ethical epistemology is naturalized. I then highlight the anti-objectivist nature of my view and argue that the view captures all those aspects of objectivism worth capturing in ethics.

Yashar Saghai, Georgetown University
"The Democratic Legitimacy of Public Health" (Session 6)
The moral imperative of integrating patients' values and preferences into medical decisions is now largely accepted. However, when it comes to public health and health policy (hereafter, PHHP), there is no consensus about the normative import of citizens' values and preferences. Even though elected bodies of representative democracies provide health agencies with a political mandate, which contributes to the legitimacy of their decisions, such a broad mandate does not entail responsiveness to the citizens' values and preferences. Is democratic involvement of the public (e.g., deliberative democratic procedures) a necessary condition for the legitimacy of PHHP or does it play other useful roles?

Silke Schicktanz and Mark Schweda, University of Göttingen
"The Epistemological and Normative Value of 'Being Affected'" (Poster Session)
"Ethics" emerges as a complex label for of new experts, institutions and soft regulations in the field of biomedicine. Various social scientists criticize this "ethicization", objecting that (soft) ethics replaces (hard) politics and law. On the basis of epistemological and ethical considerations, we argue that 'ethics expertise' has to be critically reflected. Moreover, it should be complemented by moral judgements and social opinions of those who are directly affected by the decisions made in biomedicine and health care policy. Discussing objections against more lay involvement, we develop a deliberative ethical conception of "public understanding of ethics".

Miriam Solomon, Temple University
"The Evolution of Consensus Conferences" (Sunday Morning Plenary)
Consensus conferences began in the mid-1970s at the US National Institutes of Health. They were modeled, in part, on Arthur Kantrowitz's 1967 idea of "science court" and designed to resolve scientific controversy through group deliberation. NIH consensus conferences were well received and widely imitated and adapted in the US and overseas. Consensus conference programs were modified in response to both epistemic concerns and local circumstances. One of these modifications, called the "Danish model" became paradigmatic and was imported back to the US in the late 1990s as a method for facilitating public participation in science. This paper argues that consensus conferences are *social epistemic rituals*. They claim to "make knowledge" through satisfying ideals of fairness and objectivity. The assumptions that lie behind such claims deserve critical examination. Examination of the evolution of consensus conferences helps reveal these assumptions and provides a necessary background for normative assessments.

Madeleine Suttie, Oxford University
"The Inclusion of 'Lay Experts' on Parliamentary Advisory Committees: Implications for Representation and Expertise" (Poster Session)
The recent trend to appoint community members or 'lay experts' to parliamentary advisory committees requires careful consideration. Often the 'lay expert' is included to provide commentary on broader public opinion. However, it is not clear why one particular community member is in a better position than elected representatives who are directly elected to represent the citizens, or even other committee members. Furthermore, where an elected representative may be unsure of public opinion he or she has the resources to survey it; a lay-expert does not. It is thus not clear what the 'lay expert' adds, and in this setting the term seems to be an oxymoron.

David Taylor, Independent Scholar
"Citizens, Scientists, and Citizen-Scientists: On Relieving the Tensions between Science and Democracy" (Session 1)

Mariam Thalos, University of Utah
"A Distributed Model of Normative Choice for Public Policy" (Session 3)
Economists are famous for "thinking on the margin"—for calculations based on reasoning about incremental changes to resources instead of on totals and large-scale features. This form of reasoning is emblematic of a kind of myopia that pervades even the very foundations of canonical decision theory (the theory of Expected Utility—EU). This myopia externalizes considerations about designing for risk that, as recent findings in network theory indicates, are better not simply taken as given. Moreover, the myopia produces a poor account of risk and precaution: risks are hard to assess and might even be invisible to those who reason merely "on the margin" because small to medium-sized risks, in the aggregate, ramify and telescope in unexpected ways—contrary to what EU leads us to expect. Thus *endogenizing* these considerations about risk will result in better global architecture for any system of governance—individual and collective—as an alternative to the canonical theory of rational choice.

Amy Trautwein, Baruch College, CUNY
"Fair Juries, Feeling Jurors: Rationality & Emotion in the Pursuit of Justice" (Session 6)
The constitutional right to a jury trial is an important safeguard against tyranny and oppression. Jurors are commonly instructed to ignore their emotions and base their judgments solely on facts, but, increasingly, empirical investigations have shown that emotions have a crucial role to play in rational analysis and decision-making. For instance, judgments can be changed by using language that is only subtly emotionally charged, and mock juries presented with gruesome, graphic descriptions or photos were as much as five times more likely to convict defendants. Can or should we revamp jury trials to correct these tendencies? If so, how?

Jonathan Trerise, Coastal Carolina University
"Patents and the Openness of Science" (Session 2)
I argue for a prima facie case against patents because of their uncertain benefits and the possible harms they may cause to science. The case is only prima facie as we lack sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate one way or another whether patents, on the whole, positively or negatively influence scientific research. However, the burden of proof lies with the defender of patents because of the various concerns I raise, including, importantly, evidence which shows their lackluster effectiveness as incentives to innovate. Assuming our democratic society values relatively open science, there is prima facie reason to be against patents.

Jeroen Van Bouwel, Ghent University
"What Can Democratic Theory Teach Us about Scientific Pluralism, Objectivity, and Consensus" (Session 4)
Comparing philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism, one encounters much variation. We want to clarify these different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy. Drawing on the parallels between models of scientific pluralism and models of democracy, we articulate how the plurality of knowledge systems in science could interact within a democratic framework. Furthermore, democratic theory helps us see how different knowledge systems can interact in the most productive way possible, maximizing objectivity. Finally, comparing models of science and models of democracy also shines light on the ideal of the scientific consensus.

Kyle White and Daniel Steel, Michigan State University
"Science, Values and Environmental Justice" (Session 1)
The belief that environmental injustices are prevalent in the U.S. has been challenged by some re-

(**Kyle White and Daniel Steel**, continued from previous page)
cent scientific studies that find little correlation between the location of undesirable land uses and race or income. We examine the studies on both sides of this issue from the perspective of two contrasting approaches to values in policy relevant research. The first relies on a distinction between direct and indirect roles of values, while for the second the key question is whether the influence non-epistemic values results in violations of epistemic values. We argue for the advantages of the second approach.

Eric Winsberg, University of South Florida
"Objectivity and Uncertainty in Climate Models" (Session 7)

Catherine Womack, Bridgewater State University, and **Norah Mulvaney-Day,** Center for Multicultural Mental Health Research at Cambridge Health Alliance. **"Situated Knowers"** (Session 1)
When considering sources of epistemic authority in science, one often-overlooked group is persons whose knowledge is contextual and particular, situated within some practice. Diamond (1991) calls them "situated knowers". We argue that including qualitative investigation in science allows situated knowers to be authorities on experiences relevant for both theory and policy formation. We provide philosophical and empirical arguments, discussing results of our qualitative study on experiences of agency and control among student fast-food workers. This methodological expansion is particularly important for public health ethics, including practitioners with hands-on knowledge and disenfranchised persons for whom public health programs are often designed.

Nicholas Zavediuk, St.Louis University
"Experimental Social Psychology and Deliberative Democracy" (Session 6)
This essay uses situationist social psychology as a point of departure for exploring the relevance of empirical political science for deliberative democratic theory. I argue that what is usually taken as evidence against deliberation depends on two questionable assumptions, neither of which deliberativists need be committed to. First, the empirical work tends to gauge the effects of deliberation on the reliable and stable dispositions and motivations of an idealized 'good citizen,' and second, it tends to view deliberation as a mode of politics that aims at consensus-driven interpersonal harmony. A situationist conception of moral psychology undercuts the first assumption, and I suggest that empirical studies of deliberative democracy ought to instead focus on its ethical-epistemic qualities—a research agenda based in social epistemology.

THANKS

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MAP



Sessions Lunches Hotel Party

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